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Abstract
NASA is building its first new human-rated space exploration vehicles in nearly 40 years. This marks an
important operational and cultural change from the Space Shuttle. In the wake of the Columbia disaster,
the agency and the nation realized that NASA's goals and culture needed to change. The Ares Project,
which is building the launch vehicles that will power human beings to the Moon, Mars, and beyond, is
taking a page from the Saturn playbook by having NASA lead both the overall integration and the
development of the Ares I upper stage. Ares is also creating a new culture of cooperation, openness, and
informed risk taking as we set our sights on other worlds.
Ares has established a team environment where issues can be discussed, information is shared, fun and
teamwork are encouraged, and constructive conflict and accountability are expected. Following a "One
NASA" philosophy, Ares is taking steps to strengthen cooperation among space centers, contractor
partners, engineering and scientific communities, and headquarters personnel. As we learn lessons from
things that went wrong with the Space Shuttle, we are also borrowing best practices from what has gone
right with that program and others. All of these cultural elements will be necessary as we take the next
steps beyond Earth orbit.
Background
On February 1, 2003, NASA employees were shocked and horrified to learn of the second loss of a Space
Shuttle. Even while we were still mourning the loss of the crew, many people at NASA began.some
serious soul-searching. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was formed within two hours
after the accident. After a thorough investigation, this independent review board issued the CAIB Report
called NASA to task for failures of management and culture. The professionals in the agency took the
lessons to heart but had. the fortitude and long-term vision to keep going while trying to change "the way
NASA did business."
Some critical cultural issues plagued NASA at the time of the Columbia accident, especially
communication breakdowns within the organization. The CAIB report advised the agency to establish
strong engineering technical authority and focus on safety as a core engineering discipline, rather than
simply relying on industrial safety policies.
However, the CAIB report also provided NASA with a new opportunity, as it called upon the nation to set
a clear and compelling future mission for NASA - something missing over the past three decades. The
CAIB report said, "The loss of Columbia and her crew represents a turning point, calling for a renewed
public policy debate and commitment regarding human space exploration. One ofour goals has been to
set forth the terms ofthat debate. " In January 2004, this mandate led to the Vision for Space Exploration,
now called the U.S. Space Exploration Policy, which was passed by the U.S. Congress and signed into
law by the President in 2005. This policy staged that NASA would retire the Space Shuttle by 2010,
complete the International Space Station, and develop a new set of exploration vehicles capable of
traveling to the Space Station, the Moon and other more distant destinations.
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NASAformedtheConstellationProgramto developthevehicles,hardware,andotherinfrastructure
neededto sendhumanbeingstotheMoon,establishapermanentoutposthere,andeventuallyundertake
moreambitiousmissionsto otherdestinations.TheAresProject,basedatMarshallSpaceFlightCenter
(MSFC)inHuntsville,Alabama,isresponsiblefor buildingthenewcrewandcargolaunchvehiclesthat
will takeastronautsin theOrioncrewexplorationvehicleandAltair lunarlanderintospaceandonto
otherworlds.Thisconstellationof projectshasreceivedamandatefromCongressto "goaswepay."
ThatmeansachievingthesenewexplorationgoalswithintheexistingNASAbudgetwhiletheSpace
OperationsMissionDirectoratecompletestheInternationalSpaceStationandretirestheSpaceShuttle,
andotherNASAdirectoratescontinuetheircurrentactivities:Earthobservations,aeronauticsresearch,
androboticsciencemissionstootherplanets.
Figure 1. The Ares V cargo launch vehicle (left) and Ares I crew launch vehicle (right) will launch America to
the Moon and beyond
Building Organizations from the Ground Up
The Ares Project (originally called the Exploration Launch Projects) and the Constellation Program were
started in the late summer of 2005, after an agency-wide team at NASA Headquarters completed the 90-
day Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). The ESAS team analyzed and described all of the
possible types of vehicles capable of achieving America's human exploration goals. At the end of the
study, the team selected the best complement of vehicles that could meet complete all the goals outlined
in the U.S. Space Policy. These are the vehicles we would need to build. Everything else had to be
invented from there it has proven to be challenging, exciting work.
Mike Griffin, who became NAsA Administrator in April 2005, gave the team one clear directive: If
Constellation is to be a multi-decade activity, NASA has to maintain the intellectual property on the
vehicle rather than be tied to a proprietary/contractor system. This development model was used to build
the Saturn launch vehicles for Project Apollo, but it was a new way of doing business for the current
NASA team. For the past 30 years, NASA had been using a different business model: deferring
development and operational responsibilities to contractors. Clearly to sustain exploration to multiple
destinations, over a long time period, and on a very limited budget, it was time for NASA "to get it's
hands dirty," by taking more control over the process and by accomplishing more of the technical work.
This challenge required serious operational and cultural changes. Griffin' s decision to use and support the
Saturn-type organizational model was the single most influential decision to get the Ares Project where it
is today. It has allowed NASA to retake control of its own destiny and has been crucial in obtaining
employee acceptance of, and participation in, the Constellation Program.
In early August 2005, a meeting was held with a senior MSFC management team of around 80 people
at an offsite location, where the team created a common understanding of where Ares was headed. The
team discussed its strengths, weaknesses, and concerns, and got input from everyone at the outset, and the
entire team was polled to gauge their commitment to this ambitious new effort. While people were
excited at the prospect, many were skeptical that we could marshal the resources to do the job. Once we
committed the organization, we would not have time to second-guess on our path. The team decided
unanimously to move ahead.
We verified that it was not one person's energy driving what the next steps would be, as we knew the
Ares Project was about to grow quickly, and we had to tap into the passion of the collective. The Project
established team norms at that time, and leadership continues to be a regular topic of discussion within
Ares, as managers are challenged on how things are working. The team has reached a point where it
knows that these inquiries are not personal, and that everyone wants the best for Ares and NASA.
Senior Marshall and NASA management recommend key project team members, on who should be on the
project team. It was my responsibility to name the core team of element and business managers, who in
turn would pick people to staff up their teams. Even with the core management assembled, we started out
almost 18 months behind schedule. The gap in years was widening between the time planned for Space
Shuttle retirement and the time when a replacement launch system would be available. Until the ESAS
study, the agency had stalled in deciding what the path forward would be. The Congress and the White
House were not happy about the lack of progress. Now that we had the ESAS plan, we had to pull a team
together and move out quickly to implement the plan.
Ensuring Quality, Safety, and Teamwork
Ares has two major integration challenges:
1) Technical integration of its products
2) People integration, which is getting people to focus on how they work together toward increasing
efficiency and effectiveness overall.
The CAIB report made it clear that we needed strong engineering and Safety and Mission Assurance
(S&MA) leadership on the project from day one. This approach would ensure that we had balanced
viewpoints to give us a credible, reliable, and affordable design. From the outset, we needed to do "risk-
based design," which is the process of looking for ways to improve system safety through design rather
than trying to correct things later. Some specific examples of this approach include:
• Using a single "stick" configuration for the Ares I crew launch vehicle, with the crew riding on
top instead of on the side of the launch vehicle, like the Space Shuttle Orbiter, where debris from
the launch vehicle can damage the crew vehicle
• Designing in a crew escape system that could get the crew safely away from the stack in case of
a failure during launch or ascent.
• Separating crew from cargo wherever practical (hence the separate Ares I and V vehicles).
• Using reliable, proven heritage systems and infrastructure.
Risk-based design is especially important in high-risk areas like propulsion, which resulted in using the
Shuttle booster-based first stage and Apollo-derived upper stage engine.
In the area of integrating people, an important cultural decision was made to establish behavioral
expectations and norms within the first few months of the Project. This was especially important in light
of the CAIB Report's critique of NASA's organizational culture. Ares norms include teamwork, integrity,
constant communication, constructive feedback, and accountability.
Accompanying these team norms are meeting norms, including starting and ending on time, having a
reasonable agenda, and valuing the impact of all attendees. These behaviors were established to ensure
that managers and other teammates use their time effectively and positively. Most importantly, the Ares
senior managers have worked to widely communicate and "live" these values. We also have conducted
regular surveys of our team members to see how well we are acting on our norms.
In addition, we conducted our own analysis of the CAIB Report to learn what we could do as leaders to
shift the culture toward people speaking up. In our analysis, we identified information hoarding as a
barrier to integrating across NASA centers and projects. In a follow-on leadership discussion, we raised
the issue of "image management" as a key driver of why people might hide bad news or not be fully open
about an issue. It looked to the team as if protecting an image was more important than doing the right
things in the face of difficulty. We set out to avoid repeating this mistake by serving as leaders who are
role models of openness and honesty. This sometimes means being the leader who brings bad news to the
table, but it also means that everyone has a voice. We encourage openness, we critique and analyze the
process or the problem, not the person.
The results of this have been extremely valuable. In a recent survey, we asked about honesty, and we
scored above 90% for people who believed we are honest with them. We feel this also includes Ares team
members being honest with each other, as they see it is a way of doing business within Ares and with
outside partners as well.
Ares focuses on ensuring everyone feels ownership for making the project a success - starting with the
engineers designing the system and continuing through to the Ground Operations team responsible for
launching the vehicle. It also means instilling responsibility back into the NASA team, which has been
done by making NASA the lead in developing the Ares I. In this way, our NASA engineers have
ownership in the success of the system. Our team norms require us to rely on front-line management to
guide and cross-check team members' work at the lowest levels. It also gives anyone on the team direct
access to front-line management or to independent technical experts who can argue their points of view.
We have forums (boards) for engineering, S&MA, and project managers that come together to resolve
issues/changes in an open environment free from fear of retaliation. The management team uses "lean"
processes across the project to remove excess bureaucracy and allow our team to get to the true value-
added work.
We are challenging the leadership team to a higher calling of being system leaders who care about the
whole--America's exploration goals--not just Ares. We are part of a larger system that has a mission to
complete, and we strive to align what is good for the individual (worker), project (Ares), program
(Constellation), and agency - NASA. In doing so, we create incredible momentum that we can sustain
over the long term.
Ares focuses on team building at element-level meetings and among the leadership team. We conduct
activities to increase the level of teamwork through innovative techniques versus standard "team-
building" exercises. Our teams are built by working through issues together and solving problems in the
flow of real work. Whenever possible, a team-building activity is designed to educate on key team
dynamics while simultaneously moving the Project forward.
Managers are results driven and manage using performance metrics that allow them to assess the current
quality level and make mid-course corrections to improve quality overall. We use Lean Six Sigma tools to
drive out waste, reduce bureaucracy, and improve quality.
Theannualemployeesurveyis akeyprocess/toolthathelpsuscontinuouslyreachnewlevelsof both
teamworkandquality.Regardingqualityinparticular,wefocusonbuildingrelationshipswith
stakeholderssothatall inputisconsidered,butweretainfinaldecision-makingaccountability.Wewant
partnersin theprocess,notmerelyproviders:
OneofthemostimportantmotivatorsforAreshasbeenoursimple,clear,focusedmission:"Gobuilda
rocket."Thatwastherallyingcrytheteamneededaftertwodecadesof projectsthatnevergotanywhere
duetoalackof focus,commitment,andfunding.Insteadof manysmallprojects,theteamatMSFC
becameunitedbyNASA'sandAmerica'smantra:giveusthevehiclesandtoolsweneedfor space
exploration.
Ares, Apollo, and Shuttle - Differences and Similarities
Ares draws from 50 years of lessons for developing its team and vehicles. Perhaps the most important
lesson we learned from Apollo is to lead the development of the integrated launcher with an in-house staff
and build select portions of the hardware in-house--thereby providing inspiration and ownership for our
team.
While we are borrowing management lessons from Apollo, operations are more like the early Shuttle
development in that NASA has a very constrained budget environment. Ares is unique in the fact that it is
operating in the Internet age, when news spreads almost instantly and with less risk tolerance than in
previous eras.
Like_both Apollo and Shuttle, we are employing a distributed government/industry team across many
states and organizations. In all cases, we believe that our team comprises passionate, talented people who
want to succeed. Although they are .often talented technical experts who could have chosen to use their
talents for endeavors that might be more financially rewarding, they chose a space career because they
believe exploration of this new frontier will improve life on Earth and lead to a better future. People who
work on space systems care deeply about what they do and the difference it makes to humankind.
As we've looked back, we also must look forward. Unlike 40 years ago, we are not in a space race - this
time we are developing a sustainable approach to exploration. We have more modem communication
tools than during the development of Apollo and Shuttle, enabling faster and wider information exchange.
The aerospace industry is much smaller now, and it is harder to attract the "best and brightest" to the
field; this is compounded by the fact that the U.S. has fallen behind much of the rest of the world in
graduating new engineers and scientists. In many cases, we have to rebuild our capabilities to develop
such systems. The Shuttle was being executed by the "A team" that just got humans to the moon - they
had lots of experience. In many ways, it is not just NASA, but America itself must start the journey all
over again.
The Greatest Challenges
Given the challenges NASA has faced and continues to face in this environment, convincing the team that
the effort was "real" was perhaps the largest hurdle to overcome. This was crucial after two decades of
starts and stops trying to develop a Shuttle replacement: some team members felt very jaded. Having a
clear national mandate, a more hands-on role for the agency, and our need to overcome a human
spaceflight gap helped us focus our efforts.
MSFC team members needed to rid themselves of any sense of entitlement or arrogance based on past
history. This sense of humility was instilled by constantly communicating and practicing the norm of
"confident humility," correcting individuals who did not act in this way, and then giving them challenging
assignments.It isokay to use your past experience to inform decisions; it is not okay to arrogantly assume
that past success means you are always right.
It was absolutely necessary to ensure ownership and accountability within the Project. This was done by
restructuring organizations to be product-focused, holding line managers accountable for performance,
using experienced engineering managers to check and guide the efforts of young engineers, and setting up
streamlined processes for team members to bring forward issues and ideas.
The Ares Project must continue to manage the team's workload effectively, as we have a lot on our plates.
In addition, other initiatives continue to affect our workforce, including skill development, continuous
improvement, culture shifts, and knowledge management. These items are important, and Ares leadership
discussions concentrate on figuring out how to support all of these while maintaining momentum for
building the products we need. We examine schedules for overlapping efforts, redirect workforce to assist
other groups during heavy workload times, and evaluate other possibilities on an ongoing basis. We use
Lean Six Sigma to recapture time that is identified as waste in the system. In doing so, we alleviate some
of the burden by eliminating activities that do not add high value. We encourage stand-down periods so
that employees can have a balanced work and personal life.
Working across organizational boundaries is not a cultural norm within the agency, and integration is a
word that is widely used but not clearly defined. Therefore, we have begun defining what integration
means within groups working in or for Ares. For example, the Ground Operations and Vehicle Integration
teams recently met to create a working definition between themselves. These activities ensure people
understand each other, get to know each other in person--not just through electronic communication.-
and identify specific ways to worktogether, or integrate. Eventually this type of effort will spread
throughout the Project, and we envision a better understanding of what integration means,
Lastly, the Ares team strives to communicate goals, plans, and issues up, down, and laterally within the
organization--in person--as often as possible. The senior managers understand that one-way emails
alone are not effective communication. That is why we engage in "Ares walk-abouts," small
communications forums, weekly status newsletters, and all-hands gatherings to convey and receive
information. Behaviorally, this means managers must also be approachable by team members, and have
the expectation that this attitude filters down throughout the organization.
Lessons for Moving Forward
Rebuilding an "oversight" culture into a "doing" culture is just as hard as--or harder than--building a
new rocket for the first time in three decades. However, placing clear responsibility and accountability in
the hands of the lowest levels of the organization will continue to be a major key to Ares success. Also, it
is important to have team members who know they are fully trusted to execute their roles. The experience
of building the Ares team and rockets has strengthened my faith in NASA' s ability to survive tough
issues, decisions, and public scrutiny. This survival is made easier by having a clear, easy-to-understand
goal and key stakeholders who are willing to establish, live by, and be evaluated against a set of norms.
The Ares Project must continue to translate the lessons from the past into actionable strategies that can be
used today. For example, the CAIB Report's findings can be daunting. However, if core drivers can be
identified and worked on, such speaking up rather than protecting an image, fundamental changes can
shift the culture incrementally in positive ways. However, this process will require patience because
changing organizational culture takes time.
The Ares Project will build the Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles needed to explore the Moon and
beyond. Those efforts are most successful when people feel pride and accountability for the work they
produce, and the organization delivers on its promises.
Weareworkingtoestablishaculturewhereflexibilityandchangeformthebasisof ouroperations.
Gettingtheworkforcetobein thatmindsetwill allowtheProjectobenimbleandadaptaswego.We
cannotletoldhabitsreturn,wherepeoplewantto workontheirownpetprojectsatthecostof aconcerted
teameffort.
Buildingtherockets,likebuildingtheteam,will beanongoingprocessandjourney.Liketheedgeof
spaceitself,wewill nevertruly"getthere."However,asweprogress,remaininghungryandhumble
enoughto acceptthenextchallenge,wewill buildaworld-class,affordable,safe,reliablesystemandan
organizationcapableofbringinginnovativesolutionsto thenation.
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Ares Background
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
• Columbia Accident Investigation
Board (CAIB) Report (2003)
• Called NASA to task for management
and culture failures
• Advised agency to establish strong
engineering technical authority
• Focused on safety as a core
engineering discipline
• Also provided NASA with a new
opportunity - to set a clear and
compelling future mission
•. Vision for Space Exploration
announced (2004)
• Finish the International Space Station
• Retire the Shuttle
• Build an outpost on the Moon
• Go beyond
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Ares I and Ares V
Forward Frustum
• Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle
• First new human-rated launch vehicle
design to fly in over 30 years
• Launches crew to low Earth orbit
• Uses Saturn and Shuttle heritage
propulsion designs
• First flight: Ares I-X April 2009
• First crewed flight: Orion 1 2013
• First mission to International Space
Station 2015
• Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle
• Largest rocket ever designed
• Solid rocket boosters and liquid core
stage lift Earth departure stage and
Altair lunar lander to Earth orbit
• Earth departure stage propels Altair
and Orion crew exploration vehicle
to Moon'
• 30% more capacity than Saturn V
• First flight -2019
• First mission to the Moon 2020
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The Power to Explore
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Building the Ares Project Organization
• Agency-wide team completed the
Exploration Systems Architecture
Study (ESAS)
• NASA Administrator Mike Griffin,
gave the team one clear directive:
• NASA to maintain the intellectual
property on the vehicle
• Allowed NASA to retake control of its
own destiny and obtain employee
acceptance and participation
• Established Ares team
August 2005
• People excited, but some skeptical
• Established team norms
• Senior leaders chosen to form
their teams
• Team had to pull together and
move out quickly to implement
the plan
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Ensuring Quality, Safety, and Teamwork
• Ares has two major integration
challenges:
• Technical integration of its products
• People integration
• Technical integration through risk-
based design
• Using a single "stick" configuration
• Designing in a crew escape system
• Separating crew from cargo
• Using reliable, proven heritage systems
and infrastructure
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• People integration
• Establishing team and meeting norms early
• Walking the talk - managers
modeling/living values
• Encouraging openness
• Communicate, communicate,
communicate!
• Measuring management performance
• Motivation through a simple,
straightforward mission: go build a rocket
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Ares, Apollo, and Shuttle -
Differences and Similarities
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
• Similarities
• Apollo: NASA-led development team
• Shuttle: Constrained budget
• Both: Employing distributed
government/industry team across
many states and organizations
• Differences
• Not in a space race
• More modern communication tools
• Faster and wider information
exchange
• Aerospace industry much smaller
• Harder to attract the "best and
brightest"
• U.S. not graduating as many
scientists and engineers
• It is not just NASA - America itself
must start the journey all over again
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Biggest Challenges Ahead
• Convincing the team that the effort
is "real"
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
• Ensuring a sense of humility
• Ownership and accountability
• Managing workload
• Integration among Ares elements
and other Constellation projects
• Communication
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Lessons for Moving Forward
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
• Rebuilding an "oversight" culture
into a "doing" culture is just as
hard as building a new rocket
• Translating lessons learned in the
past into actionable strategies for
the present and future
• Ensuring that the Ares
organization as a whole delivers
on its promises
• Establishing a culture of flexibility
and change
• Remaining humble yet hungry for
the next challenge
7450.10
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Questions?
www.nasa.gov/ares
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